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USING BEARD TO OVERCOME 
BEARDIANISM: CHARLES BEARD’S 
FORGOTTEN HISTORICISM AND THE 
IDEAS-INTERESTS DICHOTOMY 
Jonathan Gienapp* 
Charles Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the 
Constitution of the United States is no different than many 
scholarly classics—controversial, jarring, accessible, victim to the 
abuses and appropriations of speed-readers, and claimed as the 
original influence for several different (and sometimes 
competing) scholarly movements. As with all classics, too, Beard’s 
book makes for fresh reading. No matter how defensive Beard’s 
remark was that “[p]erhaps no other book on the Constitution has 
been more severely criticized, and so little read,”1 when one 
brushes aside the intervening appropriations and interpretations 
that have succeeded it and reads it anew, the work has an enduring 
ability to surprise. One feature that might surprise is the historicist 
impulse, which, however buried beneath classic statements of 
economic determinism, was there all along. 
Historicists come in many shapes and sizes, but they tend to 
believe that the substance of human thought and action (beliefs, 
values, and motivations) are historically constituted and, thus, are 
not universally fixed in all people in all times and places.2 
Historicists de-naturalize processes, revealing how certain 
descriptions and practices that might appear essential or 
inevitable were, in fact, contingent historical creations. 
Historicism is a methodological or philosophical posture in this 
regard more than a topic of study; plenty of non-historians are 
historicists while plenty of historians study the past without 
 * Assistant Professor of History, University of Mississippi. 
 1. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1935). 
 2. For a good discussion of historicism, see Richard Rorty, Holism and Historicism, 
in PHILOSOPHY AS CULTURAL POLITICS: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 176, 176–83 (2007). 
367 
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commitment to historicist principles.3 These latter historians tend 
to assume that some set of universal imperatives (be they 
motivations lurking deep in human nature or imperatives of an 
unchanging external world) help explain past human conduct. As 
such, Beard, a self-described economic determinist, would not 
seem an obvious candidate for the historicist label. Accordingly, 
his historicism has been easy to miss. Rather than dwell on the 
historically and culturally contingent context in which America’s 
constitutional framers operated, Beard centered on the economic 
interests they brought to the project, interests that seemingly 
transcended the particularities of the historical moment.  
Subsequent historians of the American Revolution and 
Constitution only underscored these aspects of Beard’s work. 
Beard’s economic determinist approach, and what seemed to 
accompany it, helped spawn, as is well-known, the “progressive” 
school of the American Revolution, an approach that, similarly to 
Beard, tended to interpret the Constitution as a conservative 
bulwark against popular democracy orchestrated by the 
propertied classes.4 Whatever important differences remained, 
 3. There are differences, at least in emphasis, between historicism as method and 
historicism as philosophy. In the latter case, historicists would tend to agree with Rorty 
that people are “never going to be able to see things under the aspect of eternity.” See 
Rorty, supra note 2, at ix. Historicists who are merely trying to illuminate historical 
processes would not immediately focus on such epistemological and metaphilosophical 
concerns, instead emphasizing the historical contingency of the specific human practices 
that they are trying to bring into focus. But these different kinds of historicism easily feed 
into one another. Consequently, historians took inspiration from a great many historicist 
thinkers who were not properly historians. For those working in the humanities and the 
social sciences in the last half of the twentieth century, among the most influential 
historicists, for better or for worse, were Thomas Kuhn, Michel Foucault, and Clifford 
Geertz. Each de-naturalized crucial aspects of modern life and, in the process, furnished a 
generation of inquirers with tools, often useful but sometimes cumbersome, for 
historicizing. Each was widely productive, but the following proved particularly influential: 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN 
SCIENCES (1970); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973); 
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). For more on 
these broader developments, see DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE (2011). For 
more on how these developments specifically have impacted the field of historical study, 
see WILLIAM H. SEWELL, JR., LOGICS OF HISTORY: SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION (2005); Gabrielle M. Spiegel, Introduction, in PRACTICING HISTORY: 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN HISTORICAL WRITING AFTER THE LINGUISTIC TURN 1, 1–33 
(Gabrielle M. Spiegel ed., 2005). 
 4. Collapsing any collection of historians into a single group must always be done 
with considerable caution. But, as the story is familiarly told, the “progressive” historians 
of the American Revolution emphasized the internal conflicts that the Revolution spurred 
more than the broader struggle between the colonies and Great Britain against which these 
internal conflicts were set. Accordingly, the struggle to ratify the proposed federal 
Constitution was less a political escape from colonization than it was a crucial chapter in 
the deeper struggle between different groups of Americans for control of or inclusion 
within the emerging polity. Important select works, beyond Beard’s, helped form this  
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those who contributed to this interpretive orientation were either 
increasingly linked with Marxist approaches to human inquiry or 
themselves consciously endorsed that linkage. Consequently, 
Beard’s account of the Constitution has often been explained by 
reference to materialist social theories of the nineteenth century. 
As Peter Novick wrote in his widely read work on objectivity and 
the development of the American historical profession in the 
twentieth century, Beard’s “crude reduction of Marxism to 
economic determinism,” directly “informed . . . An Economic 
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.”5 These 
intellectual commitments seemed to explain what had led Beard 
to see political ideologies as superstructural rhetoric obscuring the 
play of real economic self-interest lurking beneath (a classic 
Marxist formulation). “The theories of government which men 
entertain are emotional reactions to their property interests” is 
how he himself put the matter.6 
When historians some half-century or so after Beard came to 
acquire a new appreciation for ideology and its importance, 
Beard’s account of constitutional creation played the convenient 
foil to this emerging focus. Scholars like Bernard Bailyn, Gordon 
Wood, Edmund Morgan, Jack Greene, John Phillip Reid, and so 
many others took as their starting point the profound differences 
separating the mental world of the eighteenth century from that 
of today and thus took their task to be systematic acts of 
conceptual translation through which alone the Revolution and 
its enduring political and legal embodiment (the Constitution) 
might be understood.7 And they either consciously or implicitly 
school of interpretation: CARL LOTUS BECKER, THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN 
THE PROVINCE OF NEW YORK, 1760-1776 (1909); MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1774-1781 (1959); CURTIS P. NETTELS, THE ROOTS OF 
AMERICAN CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN COLONIAL LIFE (1938); 3 VERNON 
L. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1954). For Beard’s own 
belief that the Constitution’s advocates were seeking to secure the property classes from 
democratic intrusions, consider, “it is to the owners of personalty anxious to find a foil 
against the attacks of leveling democracy, that the authors of The Federalist address their 
most cogent arguments . . . .” See BEARD, supra note 1, at 154. 
 5. PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND 
THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 96 (1988). 
 6. See BEARD, supra note 1, at 157. “The social structure by which one type of 
legislation is secured and another prevented—that is, the constitution—is a secondary or 
derivative feature arising from the nature of the economic groups seeking positive action 
and negative restraint.” Id. at 13. 
 7. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (1967); JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2011); EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE 
RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988); JOHN PHILLIP  
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built their accounts in contradistinction to what Beard seemed to 
have advanced. This tendency was only compounded as neo-
progressive historians, who arose in response to this ideological 
reorientation of the founding era, began reviving some Beardian 
themes.8 
Emphasizing economic interest is not irreconcilable with 
historicism. But Beard was an avowed universalist who believed 
that timeless material interest explained human behavior no 
matter differences across space or through time. As he himself 
wrote, “it has seemed to me, and does now, that in the great 
transformations in society . . . economic ‘forces’ are primordial or 
fundamental, and come nearer ‘explaining’ events than any other 
‘forces.’”9 Consequently, suggesting that Beard was a historicist 
might seem far-fetched. It is not just because the observation 
might seem strikingly perverse that I raise it. It is also not to 
rescue Beard from reductionist labels, even if his work contained 
important elements not easily reconciled with the common 
determinist portrait.10 It is because grasping the historicist 
dimension in Beard, however small and buried, is helpful in 
overcoming the ahistoricist impulses that, thanks in part to Beard, 
remain deeply pervasive in historical study in particular and the 
human sciences more generally. The common thread that has tied 
REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: ABRIDGED 
EDITION (1995); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-
1787 (1969). These books represent only some of the most sophisticated spokesmen and 
only some of the best examples of each of their many contributions. 
 8. See WOODY HOLTON, FORCED FOUNDERS: INDIANS, DEBTORS, SLAVES, AND 
THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA (1999); STAUGHTON LYND, 
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RADICALISM (1968); GARY B. NASH, THE 
URBAN CRUCIBLE: THE NORTHERN SEAPORTS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (1979); ALFRED F. YOUNG, LIBERTY TREE: ORDINARY PEOPLE AND THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2006); Jesse Lemish, Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen 
in the Politics of the American Revolution, 25 WM. & MARY Q. 371, 371–407(1968). 
 9. See BEARD, supra note 1, at xii. 
 10. To be very clear, Beard’s historicism accounted for only part of his exploration. 
Much of the reason he proved such a convenient target for the ideological school was 
because he deserved to be. He engaged in his share of anachronisms, all too often allowing 
his presentist categories to overwhelm his evidence. The areas where Beard’s 
anachronisms run amok could be documented at length, such as his need to flatten most 
of the delegates’ thoughtful constitutional reflections into a crude dichotomy between 
proponents and opponents of generic democratic leveling; his insistent refusal to see 
representation as credibly derived from anything but voting (something nobody other than 
James Wilson and a few other rogues thought in eighteenth-century America); and his 
inability to move beyond The Federalist (especially his obsession with Federalist 10) to 
any of the other contemporary statements made in favor of the proposed Constitution that 
were in many ways more representative of the period’s prevailing assumptions. For 
Beard’s faulty assessment of surviving sources, in particular, see BEARD, supra note 1, at 
152–53.  
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together most accounts of the American Revolution and the 
Constitution’s creation has been Beardianism. 
Beard’s account of constitutional creation has been largely 
discredited. Yet he remains as vital as ever; whether the implied 
target of new arguments or inspiration for a new “progressive” 
account of the Revolution (purified of his missteps and excesses 
of course), Beard continues to frame much of the conversation.11 
No matter how many years pass or how much new research 
surfaces, he does not seem to recede permanently into the 
unknown. The primary reason Beard remains so relevant is 
because of the pernicious, yet amazingly compelling, distinction 
between ideas and interests that he did so much to perpetuate. 
Beard’s specific argument has been dismantled, but the Beardian 
conceptual architecture remains firmly in place, taken for granted 
at so many turns that its persistent influence remains hard to 
detect. In other words, one can repudiate Beard (his conclusions) 
while perpetuating Beardianism (his guiding premises). As long 
as we continue to think of ideology and interests as categorically 
distinct and antagonistic, we will all remain Beardians in an 
important sense. 
The lingering and unfortunate appeal of this framing 
dichotomy is owed in part to the ambiguity that continues to 
surround ideology and its cognates. Ideology has meant both a set 
of principles, ideals, or values to which individuals willingly 
subscribe; or, it has also meant a structured consciousness, a 
phenomenological perspective that rests at the very bottom of 
human perception. In the latter instance, the matter would better 
be described as a culture, a conceptual framework, or a mode of 
consciousness.12 This rival version involves little willing 
 11. See TERRY BOUTON, TAMING DEMOCRACY: “THE PEOPLE,” THE FOUNDERS, 
AND THE TROUBLED ENDING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2007); WOODY 
HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (2007). Both 
authors have built accounts of 1780s American constitutional development around a 
Beardian framework. 
 12. Versions of this conception are often owed to the work of Clifford Geertz. See 
GEERTZ, supra note 3. Among the works of history that have skillfully invoked this sort of 
model, see KEITH MICHAEL BAKER, INVENTING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: ESSAYS ON 
FRENCH POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1990); J. G. A. POCOCK, 
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE 
ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975) [hereinafter MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT]; 2 
QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1978). 
Skinner’s and Pocock’s several sophisticated methodological contributions all have 
contemplated ideology in this fashion. See, for instance, Quentin Skinner, Meaning and 
Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 HIST. & THEORY 3 (1969); Quentin Skinner, On 
Performing and Explaining Linguistic Actions, 21 PHIL. Q. 1 (1971); Quentin Skinner, 
Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action, 2 POL. THEORY 277 (1974);  
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subscription, it is not a set of principles or commitments that one 
chooses. It is a way of organizing one’s surroundings and giving 
them sense, a perceptual mode that precedes the formation of 
either principles or interests. Just as there could be no beliefs or 
desires without such a mode (without understanding of how to use 
available semantic vocabularies to give meaning to the world), 
there could be no principles or interests. Since there are no pre-
perceptual interests, there is certainly no formation or recognition 
of economic self-interest independent of the semantic conceptual 
framework that makes it possible.13 
Beard, of course, did not grasp this point and incorrectly 
assumed that economic interests were innate, universal, and 
independent of cultural perception. But Beardianism, in its most 
generic form, remains vital because his failure to grasp the 
historicist and cultural origins of interests still resonates.14 As long 
as we continue to think that ideas, ideologies, or values stand in 
opposition to interests or the prospect of material gain we will still 
reside in Beard’s world, because those who take ideas seriously 
will spend much of their time attempting to prove (likely 
unsuccessfully) that historical speakers were sincere while those 
who take interests seriously will paint ideas as little more than 
rhetorical covers, easy enough to brush aside in order to 
determine what was really going on. The day that we fully realize 
that neither principles nor interests exist independently of the 
perceptual mode that accounts for them, and that it becomes the 
job of all historians (whether intellectual, social, economic, 
Quentin Skinner, Hermeneutics and the Role of History, 7 NEW LITERARY HIST. 209 
(1975). For Pocock, see J. G. A. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE, AND TIME: ESSAYS ON 
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY (1971); J. G. A. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND 
HISTORY: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY CHIEFLY IN THE EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY (1985); J. G. A. POCOCK, POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY: ESSAYS ON 
THEORY AND METHOD (2009). 
 13. Philosophers of mind and language have authored the most penetrating work on 
this subject. As philosopher Robert Brandom has so trenchantly put it, “Though linguistic 
practice does, to be sure, help us in pursuing our ends, the vast majority of those ends are 
ones we could not so much as entertain, never mind secure, apart from our participation in 
linguistic practice. Most of the things we want to do we can only even want to do because 
we can talk. The very intelligibility of the ends depends on our linguistic capacities. They 
are precisely not goals we can make sense of first, so that later language can be brought 
into the picture playing the role of a possible tool for achieving them.” ROBERT B. 
BRANDOM, PERSPECTIVES ON PRAGMATISM: CLASSICAL, RECENT, CONTEMPORARY 80 
(2011). Richard Rorty has similarly added that a revolutionary “new vocabulary makes 
possible, for the first time, a formulation of its own purpose.” RICHARD RORTY, 
CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 13 (1989). 
 14.  David Armitage, What’s the Big Idea? Intellectual History and the Longue Durée, 
38 HISTORY OF EUROPEAN IDEAS 493, comments briefly, but powerfully, on how this 
economistic reasoning continues to affect the history of ideas in far-reaching ways.  
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political, or cultural) to reconstitute the different perceptual 
framework of the historical actors in question, is the day we early 
Americanists and students of constitutional history will leave 
Beardianism behind. 
More than most fields of study, the study of the American 
Revolution remains ensnared in this false ideas-interests 
dichotomy, one that should be abandoned once and for all.15 The 
most well-known intellectual historian of the Revolution, Gordon 
Wood, has recently suggested that ideas, if not the cause of 
behavior, forever accompany it, meaning that the conventional 
ideas-interests divide requires amendment. While correct and 
useful, Wood’s suggestion does not go far enough and revitalizes, 
as much as it dismantles, the distinction that he targets. As he has 
written, “What is permissible culturally affects what is permissible 
socially or politically, so that although ideas may not be the 
motives for behavior (underlying interests and passions are the 
real motives), ideas do affect and limit behavior.”16 Indeed, plans 
of action cannot be legitimate unless defended with culturally 
legitimate reasons. Even if we assumed that the American framers 
were thoroughly self-interested, it would still be our primary task 
to reconstitute the conceptual vocabularies that animated them, 
since those would be necessary to grasp how they gave the world 
meaning, an understanding from which alone we could make 
sense of their behavior, behavior which notably involved 
constructing the United States’ Federal Constitution. But the so-
called “passions” and “interests,” every bit as much as the ideas 
that accompanied them, are the product of meaning and culture. 
They cannot exist prior to perception, they cannot make any sense 
or motivate anything detached from the ordering framework of a 
conceptual vocabulary, so they certainly should not be seen as 
something distinct in character from ideas. They are distinct by 
 15. Jack Rakove acknowledges and briefly describes the pervasiveness of this 
dichotomy in Revolutionary American scholarship; see Jack Rakove, Can We Know a 
Foundational Idea When We See One?, in NATURE AND HISTORY IN AMERICAN 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A DEBATE 91, 91–112 (2006). As just one revealing example, 
see the WM. & MARY Q. symposium issue that focused on Gordon Wood’s seminal 
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, which, despite intense disagreement among 
commentators, was shaped by a pervasive commitment to the ideology-interest divide. See 
Forum: The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787: A Symposium of Views and 
Reviews, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 549–640 (1987). Also consider the conceptual framing at 
work in one of Wood’s earlier and more famous essays, Gordon S. Wood, Rhetoric and 
Reality in the American Revolution, 23 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1966). 
 16. GORDON S. WOOD, THE IDEA OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON THE BIRTH OF 
THE UNITED STATES 17 (2011). This formulation largely derives from the seminal Quentin 
Skinner piece, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas.”  
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degree, but certainly not by kind. So, contrary to Wood’s 
unfortunate concession, it does not make sense to say that 
interests motivate behavior while ideas do not since interests are 
a form of ideas, a product of the same semantic languages that 
human beings use to cope with their world successfully. Thus, 
explaining the framers’ behavior (be it principled or interested) 
will prove impossible without a sophisticated grasp of the 
historically constituted conceptual materials that shaped their 
fundamental consciousness. 
Accordingly, given his firm belief that all thought was 
reducible to interest, Beard tells us little about American 
constitutional creation. But, if only inadvertently, he does tell us 
something important about Revolutionary conceptual materials. 
Not surprisingly, he failed to draw out the full implications of his 
observations; but the historicist impulse lurking within warrants 
exploration. Because even if Beard’s work and approach was 
deeply ahistoricist and even if his approach has helped burden us 
with an ahistorical notion of self-interest, important observations 
that he offered can, if properly explored, compel us to grasp some 
of those distinctly different Revolutionary mental materials and 
patterns of thought through which alone the Constitution’s origins 
might be understood. In others words, carrying through on an 
important aspect of Beard might enable us to overcome 
Beardianism once and for all. 
In intriguing ways, Beard took the eighteenth century 
seriously on its own terms. He, for instance, thought that he was 
applying eighteenth-century political science to the construction 
of the Constitution. “In fact,” as he wrote in his opening pages, 
“the inquiry which follows is based upon the political science of 
James Madison, the father of the Constitution and later President 
of the Union he had done so much to create.”17 This observation 
marks no revelation; but it is worth considering some of the 
substantive ways in which Beard actually followed through on this 
assertion and what it helps us see about the eighteenth century 
itself. 
Much eighteenth-century political science, and especially 
Madison’s, limited the importance of human personality and 
charisma in understanding political phenomena. This insight 
proved attractive to Americans in part because, as they had long 
realized, republics were fragile entities easily corrupted by 
 17. See BEARD, supra note 1, at 14.  
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unvirtuous leaders.18 A well-structured polity, a republic that 
could endure, was then precisely one that was so perfectly 
organized, that successfully united underlying political forces in 
such perfect harmony, that it generated a system that could run 
successfully in most hands. Eighteenth-century theorists 
expressed varying degrees of optimism regarding this idea’s 
explanatory power. Some still insisted that personal virtue 
remained an indispensable dimension of republican politics, no 
matter how well-structured a regime might be. But, nonetheless, 
many American constitutional thinkers felt confident that the 
American experiment in government would prove successful 
because they had come to adequately understand and apply the 
emerging principles of political science, ones that privileged deep 
structure in questions of political architecture.19 They had learned, 
most notably from the widely read French political theorist 
Montesquieu and the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, that 
understanding human nature and politics involved grasping the 
deep underlying springs that organized both people and regimes, 
forces which, if properly activated and orchestrated, could do 
more than the character of any subsequent individual leader to 
ensure sound, long-term governance. American constitutional 
thinkers believed that political science had taught them that those 
who made political decisions were often less decisive in the 
ultimate scope of history than the underlying political structures 
that were in place when those decisions were made. Their science, 
in other words, was increasingly a structural and mechanistic one. 
Thus, eighteenth-century sources had taught Beard, and 
correctly, that many early American political thinkers were 
interested in how underlying structural principles took priority 
over individual political agency. Beard, in a meaningful sense 
then, applied this principle against the men who arrived at it, 
suggesting that the underlying structural principles in place at the 
time of the Constitution’s construction had more to do with its 
eventual makeup than did the idiosyncratic choices of the 
delegates who populated the convention. Scientifically 
understanding political outcomes was a matter of grasping the 
mechanistic springs that undergirded the actors’ specific political 
 18. For more on the fragility of republics in early modern political thinking, see 
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, supra note 12. 
 19. Gordon S. Wood, America’s Enlightenment, in AMERICA AND ENLIGHTENMENT 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 159, 159–175 (Gary L. McDowell & Johnathan O’ Neill eds., 2006) 
(discussing the optimism shared among Revolutionary American political thinkers).  
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existence. As Beard himself wrote in the preface to the 1935 
edition of An Economic Interpretation,  
In that study I had occasion to read voluminous writings by the 
Fathers, and I was struck by the emphasis which so many of 
them placed upon economic interests as forces in politics and 
in the formulation of laws and constitutions. In particular I was 
impressed by the philosophy of politics set forth by James 
Madison in Number X of the Federalist . . . which seemed to 
furnish a clue to practical operations connected with the 
formation of the Constitution—operations in which Madison 
himself took a leading part.20  
Beard followed this statement by disputing that he was shaped by 
Marx, an apology that was perhaps overblown. But it is important 
to recognize what he was saying—that before thinkers in the 
nineteenth century began obsessing over social structures and 
their relationship to politics, eighteenth-century thinkers 
(especially the architects of the United States Constitution), in a 
manner quite different than their successors, were themselves 
deeply invested in deciphering a structural relationship between 
society and politics. 
Beard’s interest in eighteenth-century political science did 
not stop there. When he justified his reliance on Madison, he, as 
many subsequent historians and political scientists have, 
extensively quoted Federalist 10. Among the important points 
that he identified in this famous essay was the relationship 
between factions and property-holding, a connection captured 
best in a Madisonian statement on which Beard heavily relied: 
“The most common and durable source of factions has been the 
various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and 
those who are without property have ever formed distinct 
interests in society.”21 Beard referred to these statements, 
somewhat awkwardly, as a “masterly statement of economic 
determinism in politics.”22 It was doubtfully that, but Beard’s 
appreciation of this Madisonian statement and the conventional 
wisdom on which it was built was sound and important. 
Madison was saying little that was new for his time. In fact he 
was reiterating something that republican political theorists had 
been insisting upon for centuries—namely, that the balance of 
 20. See BEARD, supra note 1, at vi. 
 21. James Madison, THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 181(Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976). 
 22. See BEARD, supra note 1, at vii.  
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property determined the balance of power. From Machiavelli and 
Thomas More, to James Harrington and Montesquieu, to the 
disaffected English “country” Whigs like John Trenchard and 
Thomas Gordon, virtually all political writers of this era took it as 
commonplace that the distribution of property largely determined 
what kind of regime might endure in a given society. Effectively 
their point was always the same, only in a society where there was 
a relatively equal distribution of property could republican 
political institutions flourish.23 It was not a normative statement 
about what sort of a regime was preferable, but entirely a 
descriptive one about what sorts of necessary conditions made 
certain regimes possible.  
Hence these republican forebears spent considerable time 
studying the ancient Roman agrarian laws, while Revolutionary 
Americans who were themselves persuaded by this thinking 
obsessed over repealing English land-inheritance practices bent 
on consolidating wealth (such as primogeniture and entail) in 
their new state legal codes, and Federalists during the ratification 
struggle reiterated time and again that the greatest protection 
against the kind of aristocratic centralization that Anti-federalists 
thought the Constitution all but assured was the relatively 
equitable distribution of wealth that already existed in America.24 
The United States, Federalists maintained, would remain 
republican in spite of constitutional innovation because it enjoyed 
the requisite social makeup. Fisher Ames, the Massachusetts 
Federalist, hinted at so much when he said that the Revolution 
had provided the chance “to reduce to practice the schemes, 
which Plato and Harrington had only sketched upon paper,” 
schemes which would enable the American republic to be 
“perfect and perpetual.”25 And Jonathan Jackson, another 
Federalist from Massachusetts, made the point even more 
explicitly: 
 23. See ERIC NELSON, THE GREEK TRADITION IN REPUBLICAN THOUGHT (2004). 
 24. For more on the abolition of primogeniture and entail in the new American states 
and its ideological significance, see 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 305–24 (Julian 
P. Boyd, et al. eds., 1950). For a good example of American political writing that betrays 
this early modern republican preoccupation, connects Roman agrarian laws to the 
American abolition of primogeniture and entail, and draws upon these arguments to 
defend the proposed American Federal Constitution, see NOAH WEBSTER, AN 
EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1787). 
For more on all of these topics, see NELSON, supra note 23, at 195–233. 
 25. FISHER AMES, Camillus IV, THE INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE, Mar. 8, 1787, 
reprinted in WORKS OF FISHER AMES VOL. II, 82 (W. B. Allen ed., 1983).  
 
5 - USING BEARD TO OVERCOME BEARDIANISM (DO NOT DELETE) 7/21/2014  9:16 AM 
378 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 29:367 
When we consider the small inequality of fortune throughout 
this country, compared with others which we know . . . [t]hat in 
most of the states the laws of primogeniture are gone or going, 
out of use—that landed property is in general held in small 
portions, even in the southern states, compared with the 
manors, parks and royal demesnes of most countries – that 
without the establishment of entails, it is almost impossible for 
estates to grow to an alarming size, or even to continue long in 
the same families . . . the period must be far distant, very far 
distant, when there can be such a monopoly of landed estates, 
as to throw the suffrages or even influence of electors into few 
hands . . . . [W]here is the risk of an aristocracy dangerous to 
liberty?26 
John Adams summed up the logic concisely, “In America, the 
right of sovereignty resides indisputably in the body of the people, 
and they have the whole property of the land.”27 Political 
structure, in other words, derived from social constitution. The 
kind of laws and government that were conducive to a given 
people were firmly a product of their society’s character. When 
Beard remarked that the framers “undoubtedly understood and 
approved the doctrine of balanced classes in the government as 
expounded in Adams’ Defence of American Constitutions, he was 
gesturing towards this crucial eighteenth-century preoccupation.28 
But Madison was not entirely derivative; had he merely been 
a good Machiavellian or Harringtonian in his sociological 
thinking, he would have had a great deal to say about landed 
property and much less to say about personal property (or 
“realty” as opposed to “personalty” to invoke Beard’s famous 
lexicon). But the financial and commercial revolutions of the 
eighteenth century had required republican thinkers to ponder 
new categories of analysis.29 The feudal outlook of Harrington and 
 26. JONATHAN JACKSON, THOUGHTS UPON THE POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 56, 56, 57 (1788). 
 27. JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 309 (1787). 
 28. See BEARD, supra note 1, at 194. In general, when Beard explored what he called 
the “political doctrines” of the framers he was not just flattening their thought and 
imposing modern ideas of social structure and economic interest on it. He was also 
grasping, as this quote reveals, some of the ways in which eighteenth-century actors 
contemplated their own understanding of society and structure. Id. at 189–216. 
 29. See JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY, AND THE ENGLISH 
STATE, 1688-1783 (1989); P. G. M. DICKSON, THE FINANCIAL REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND: 
A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC CREDIT 1688-1756 (1967); CARL 
WENNERLIND, CASUALTIES OF CREDIT: THE ENGLISH FINANCIAL REVOLUTION, 1620-
1720 (2011). For the American example, see E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE 
PURSE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE, 1776-1790 (1961). For the dynamic  
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the English commonwealth tradition left one’s structural analysis 
at a dead end by the eighteenth century. Civil society was far more 
diverse and multifaceted than such a model suggested, and 
Madison, like most American constitutional thinkers, knew that 
this complex array of economic and social interests interacted 
with politics in crucial ways. Here Madison combined the 
republican interest in determinate social constitution with the 
newer idea (worked out primarily by Scottish Enlightenment 
thinkers such as Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson) that politics 
was derivative of a complex civil society comprised of interlocking 
economic interdependencies.30 Thus, in Federalist 10 Madison did 
not stop at landed wealth but indeed meditated upon the 
numerous kinds of economic and social personality that politics 
ultimately reflected. And it was this newer, eighteenth-century 
appreciation of determinate social constitution that struck Beard 
as so important. When he attempted to map, in extensive detail, 
the multifaceted kinds of economic interests existent and 
operative in Revolutionary America, Beard was helping show 
how a varied civil society had provided a far more complicated 
social portrait than had previously constituted American life, one 
that, given the dictates of eighteenth-century political scientific 
thinking, posed important challenges.31 
Madison was not an “economic determinist” in any modern 
sense, despite Beard’s insistence; but that is precisely the point. It 
is difficult today to talk about relationships between social 
structure and politics without inadvertently encumbering the 
discussion with the teachings (however diluted) of nineteenth-
century social theory generally and Marx specifically. But Beard, 
ways in which these economic revolutions altered political thought and argument in the 
eighteenth century, see MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, supra note 12. 
 30. For the Scottish Enlightenment’s conception of “civil society,” see J. G. A. 
Pocock, Cambridge Paradigms and Scotch Philosophers: A Study of the Relations Between 
the Civic Humanist and the Civil Jurisprudential Interpretation of Eighteenth-Century 
Social Thought, in WEALTH AND VIRTUE: THE SHAPING OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE 
SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 235, 235–52 (Istvan Hont & Michael Ignatieff eds., 1984); 
DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1991); Fania Oz-
Salzberger, Civil Society in the Scottish Enlightenment, in CIVIL SOCIETY: HISTORY AND 
POSSIBILITIES 58, 58–83 (Sudipta Kaviraj & Sunil Khilnani eds., 2001). For the connections 
between Scottish and French economic thought, particularly as it related to new 
understandings of extra-governmental spaces of human interaction, see DANIEL GORDON, 
CITIZENS WITHOUT SOVEREIGNTY: EQUALITY AND SOCIABILITY IN FRENCH THOUGHT, 
1670-1789 (1994); EMMA ROTHSCHILD, ECONOMIC SENTIMENTS: ADAM SMITH, 
CONDORCET, AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT (2001). For more on “civil society” generally, 
see Keith Michael Baker, Enlightenment and the Institution of Society: Notes for a 
Conceptual History, in MAIN TRENDS IN CULTURAL HISTORY 95, 95–120 (Willem 
Melching & Wyger Velema eds., 1994). 
 31. See BEARD, supra note 1, at 26–51 (discussing this particular portrayal).  
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only inadvertently, helps us see that the eighteenth century had 
its own understanding of social constitution and its relationship to 
politics, one that proved indispensable to the Revolutionaries’ 
political and constitutional thought. In this regard, even if Beard 
could not see his historicism all the way through, we can. And in 
so doing, we can recapture something pivotal. 
But taking Beard’s historicism seriously also sheds light on 
Beard himself. For some time, Beard has largely been known for 
two things—for offering the definitive economic or self-interested 
take on the construction of the American Constitution and for 
authoring one of the most controversial and enduring presidential 
addresses ever delivered before the American Historical 
Association, in which he openly wondered if historical inquiry 
rested or ever could rest on secure epistemological foundations.32 
It has appeared strange to many that the avowed economic 
determinist, who seemed to be warring against the winds of 
postmodernism before they even swept through the academy, 
could later play the epistemological skeptic with not only such 
ease but with such zealous conviction.33 
But, if what has been argued here is any indication, it 
becomes much easier to comprehend how Beard traveled from 
one project to the next, a transition that has often been regarded 
as a complete reversal of convictions. For if Beard’s great insight, 
as he himself saw it, was that Madison’s own political science 
better explained the character of the Constitution than anything 
else Madison or any of the other delegates declared or sought—
if, in other words, he had turned the eighteenth century against 
itself—then how could he himself in the early twentieth century 
not wonder if the same could be done to him and, in turn, all 
historians? Now, surely, much of Beard’s presentism (and 
subsequent reflections upon that) was linked to his own political 
activism and the urgent, polemical tendencies that grew out of it. 
But, nonetheless, his interest in the modern historian’s difficulties 
that emerged in trying to adequately represent the past also owed 
something to his scholarly reflections. It was in part because 
Beard had not dismissed the eighteenth century’s particularity, 
but instead that he had, to his mind, embraced it on its own terms, 
 32. Charles A. Beard, Written History as an Act of Faith, in 39 AMERICAN 
HISTORICAL REVIEW 219, 219–31 (1934). 
 33. See NOVICK, supra note 5, at 256–57. Those who have detected an affinity 
between the two intellectual contributions have emphasized that the presentist, political 
agenda governing the historical work fed the relativist epistemological reflections. This 
connection is distinct from the one I want to suggest.  
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that he had begun wondering aloud if any historian’s work, much 
like any constitution-writer’s work, could escape its particular 
historical conditioning. Beard’s historicism failed in many ways, 
but he did not think so and that helps us understand both his later 
development and how Beard himself might be deployed against 
Beardianism. 
Much as Beard tried to turn the founders back against 
themselves, I have turned Beard back against himself in the hopes 
of moving past Beardianism. Beard’s classic book should not be 
forgotten—it still represents an important historiographical 
touchstone, one to which all students of the Revolutionary era 
ought to be exposed; nor should Beard be forgotten—students of 
Progressive-era America and especially its intellectual currents 
must continue (as they already ably have) to explore Beard and 
the intellectual and institutional world that shaped him.34 What 
should be forgotten and brushed aside is Beardianism—or the 
need to conflate the obvious point that some people in all societies 
(especially political leaders) will be self-interested and that 
economic and regional interests have played and will continue to 
play a role in politics with the much different point that interests 
are pre-perceptual, and thus prior to and independent of the use 
of a historically contingent conceptual vocabulary. A fully 
historicist understanding of ideas and interests forces us to 
retrieve and reconstitute the perceptual framework that animated 
even the most unscrupulous and self-interested of politicians, 
because not everybody needs principles but all humans, to 
meaningfully act, must be equipped with the materials by which 
they can give their world meaning. Beardianism, and its legacy, 
still prevents us from seeing things in that fully historicist fashion. 
Might we then turn Beard back against himself to simultaneously 
appreciate Beard while demolishing Beardianism in the process? 
 
 34. Many have begun exploring the importance of Beard’s thought within the context 
of Progressive-era America. See CUSHING STROUT, THE PRAGMATIC REVOLT IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY: CARL BECKER AND CHARLES BEARD (1958); RICHARD 
HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS: TURNER, BEARD, PARRINGTON (1968); 
ELLEN NORE, CHARLES A. BEARD: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY (1983); LEON FINK, 
PROGRESSIVE INTELLECTUALS AND THE DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENT 
(1997); CLYDE W. BARROW, MORE THAN A HISTORIAN: THE POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF CHARLES A. BEARD (2000); KAREN ORREN AND STEPHEN 
SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (2004); JOHN 
LOUIS RECCHIUTI, CIVIC ENGAGEMENT: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PROGRESSIVE-ERA 
REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY (2006). 
  
 
